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 Abstract. The article presents an unconventional although not 
absolutely unprecedented view on abstract objects defending the 
position of metaphysical realism. It is argued that abstract objects 
taken in purely ontological sense are the forms of objects. The forms 
possess some common characteristics of abstract objects, they can 
exist not in physical space and time and play a grounding role in their 
relation to concrete objects. It is stated that commonly discussed 
abstract objects – properties, kinds, mathematical objects – are forms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Abstract objects are of two major interests for 
philosophers and scientists. Firstly they are the 
referents of scientific and everyday speech. 
Without referring to abstract objects scientific 
and everyday language would be deprived of the 
means of generalization what would be fatal for 
science and nearly so for everyday communica-
tion. Secondly they are the key item of metaphys-
ics. Their clear understanding reveals what sort 
of reality we live in. The problem of abstract ob-
jects is commonly admitted as central to modern 
philosophy dealing with metaphysical problems. 
Philosophical texts of the last decades show spe-
cial and not decreasing interest for the problem 
which has the form of the discussion between 
two conceptions of abstract objects. One is tradi-
tionally marked as metaphysical realism another 
as nominalism. Sometimes realism is associated 
with Platonism, sometimes there is more sophis-
ticated distinction between realism and Platon-
ism like that argued in the book of W. L. Craig [3, 
p. 13]. The difference is in the scope of abstract 
objects but both variants accept some. So we may 
call the both “metaphysical realists”. The contro-
versy of metaphysical realists and nominalists 
has long history which cannot be traced here. 
Still some recent traits should be noted. There is 
generally accepted standard understanding of its 
subject matter. The defining characteristics of 
abstract objects are three according to S. Cowl-
ing: 1) lack of any causal role in the world; 2) lack 
of spatiotemporal location; 3) special epistemic 
access to them [2, p. 2]. This is quite standard 
representation of abstract objects. Philosophers 
discern different kinds of them, particularly: 
mathematical entities, properties and, proposi-
tions [2, p. 3]. One may add natural kinds as one 
of the most significant group of abstract objects.  
The theme of abstract objects is well elaborated. 
New ideas in this domain of philosophy seem in-
evitably to be a reminder of very old and well 
known ones. Such is the J. Porter Moreland’s in-
terpretation of the problem of universals as that 
concerning “One and Many” problem [12, p. 11]. 
There is also thoroughly developed standard sys-
tems of arguments and counter-arguments for 
and against realism and nominalism. Arguments 
against nominalism in details are formulated in a 
paper of Z. G. Szabo [14], most widely used 
among them – indispensability argument and the 
context principle [14, pp. 29, 33]. One should 
note also the refutation of nominalism by G. 
Rosen [13]. Well-grounded arguments against 
realism may be found in C. Dorr’s chapter in 
“Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics” which 
are based on the contrast between superficial 
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and more profound way of talking about abstract 
objects [4, p. 9–11]. F. MacBride analysing the 
contemporary debate on universals finds the es-
sence of differences in the understanding by phi-
losophers of the degree and character of orderli-
ness in the Universe [11, p. 278]. 
The contemporary realists-nominalists dispute 
reminds of а grandmasters’ chess game in which 
all the debut moves are long known, counted and 
foreseen. Arguments and counter-arguments be-
come more and more subtle but do not go be-
yond some limits. The dispute seems to move by 
circle. The necessity is felt to view the problem 
from another point which may be not absolutely 
new but has not been in a focus of interest at the 
recent phase of debate. The objective of this pa-
per is to present such unconventional view de-
fending the position of metaphysical realism. 
Two main questions will be answered: How else 
(besides known definitions) can be defined the 
objects generally called abstract? What does their 
real existence mean? 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
We have to define with new degree of precision 
the objects of our interest. It is the task to find 
new boundaries of a known phenomenon. First 
of all let`s take apart two principally incompati-
ble viewpoints on abstract objects. One is onto-
logical, another – epistemological. They are 
commonly go together at philosophical texts of 
analytic orientation. Abstract objects are defined 
having properties of lacking locality, causal neu-
trality and special cognitive access as though 
these properties are of the same type. It seems 
natural to regard abstract objects as a result of 
abstraction. Logic of such research strategy is 
that abstractness is a sort of mental representa-
tion, which may well refer on not refer to reality. 
The central point of discussion becomes the 
problem of reference to abstract objects. How 
imperceptible objects could be referred to is 
qualified as the fundamental point in philosophi-
cal theories of reference [8, p. 50]. The search for 
truth-conditions based on the context principle 
of G. Frege becomes in this case the way of expla-
nation [8, p. 51]. The aim is, according to 
M. Dummett thought, to find “some content” 
while identifying the referent of abstract singular 
terms [5, p. 65]. Why reality is liable to such con-
structive efforts by human mind is out of ques-
tion here. The most suitable image of this treat-
ment of the problem is, in M. Eklund words, 
when “reality considered in itself is like some 
amorphous dough and our concepts are like 
cookie cutters, carving up reality into objects” [6, 
p. 383].  
Another vision of reality (represented in this pa-
per) presupposes that reality is not chaotic. Such 
vision needs the differentiation of reality from 
the human cognitive process. Accordingly there 
are two principally different ways of being for 
abstract objects – as they exist by themselves (if 
they exist at all) and as they exist within human 
cognition. Existence of abstract objects regard-
less of their cognition is seen as a special aspect 
of their problem. The question is whether this 
aspect can be differentiated from the cognitive 
one. The common belief of analytical philoso-
phers (especially nominalists) is that it cannot. 
The decisive premise of this paper, on the con-
trary, is that independently existing abstract ob-
jects are conceivable. Our cognitive ability of ab-
straction may go further than constructing ab-
stract objects. We can abstract as well from the 
process of abstraction leaving ‘within the brack-
ets” just the objects and their objective existence. 
This is purely metaphysical point of view and 
from now on abstract objects will be understood 
this way only. 
Limiting and purifying the understanding of ab-
stract objects we need to part with equivocation 
of existing objects and objects’ existence. Exis-
tence is not a rare ground to the solution of the 
abstract objects problem. Contrast between ab-
stract and concrete objects is often seen as the 
two types of existence. It is not a real solution but 
the transference of the difficulties in abstract ob-
jects analyses to the new and more obscure 
sphere of existence. The perspective of finding 
right decision becomes more vague as 
G. Imaguire reasonably notices “we have far too 
many different conceptions of existence; and 
possibly worse, we have different concepts of ex-
istence” [9, p. 376]. There is another way to solve 
the problem of abstract objects by means of exis-
tence analyses. One does not identify abstract 
objects with a special form of existence but uses 
the known, well studied forms. Such is the juxta-
position of concrete and abstract objects with 
actual and possible existence. This conception 
unites the spheres of abstract objects and possi-
ble worlds [1, p. 238]. As a matter of fact this 
conception ruins the very phenomenon of ab-
stract objects as they become indiscernible from 
the possible objects. Our analysis is based on rec-
ognizing the actual existence of abstract objects 
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as only this way the problem becomes worth 
thinking about. Another kind of using the known 
form of existence in explaining abstract objects is 
the presentist conception of A. Filomeno. Ab-
stract entities exist according to it in the same 
way as past and future things exist [7, p. 177]. At 
least the former and he latter share such proper-
ties as the lack of locality and causal inactiveness. 
This analogy is interesting and may have some 
ontological grounds but hardly reveals the es-
sence of abstract objects. Abstract objects seem 
to be something more fundamental than a mere 
representation of a form of time.  
The main idea of this part of discussion is that 
existence of abstract objects is not abstract exis-
tence. It is no use to differentiate existence be-
cause of its extreme abstract character. Existence 
is existence and our intuitive understanding of 
the term is enough here. Surely the existence of 
abstract objects as real is extremely important to 
explain. Such explanation appears to be the ulti-
mate point of discussion. Still the very term of 
existence does nothing to solve the problem. We 
may part with it to continue the search.  
Standard set of abstract objects properties in-
cludes lack of causal power. Note that negative 
property is already questionable. What do ab-
stract objects possess instead of causal power? 
Lack of interaction with concrete spatial objects 
makes it difficult to define the place of abstract 
objects in the world structure. It looks like there 
is no connection between different kinds of ob-
jects. Lack of causal power should not be just 
stated, it must be explained and the ties of ab-
stract objects with other parts of reality must be 
revealed. Not going into discussion of causal 
problems in metaphysics let`s just take into ac-
count far from clear understanding of this phe-
nomenon. There are too many explanations of 
the essence of causal relation and how it works in 
modern philosophy.  
When it is said that abstract objects lack causal 
power the cause is understood as a physical in-
teraction factor. Causality means the contact be-
tween physical objects in time and space leading 
to some spatial changes. Abstract objects obvi-
ously don’t act this way. But if abstract objects 
exist they have to be somehow involved in causal 
processes, though apparently indirectly. They 
have to be connected with concrete causes and 
effects. This connection may be not directly 
causal but it must have something in common 
with causality. So we have to view the abstract-
concrete relation in a broader context. The most 
general context is marked by the term ‘determin-
ism’, causality in particular is a kind of determin-
ism. If we cannot say about abstract objects in 
terms of causality, we can analyse the determi-
nistic role of abstract objects.  
The sort of determinism associated with abstract 
objects is grounding. Abstract objects (if they ex-
ist) ground the existence of concrete objects. By 
grounding we mean the objects existence of 
which is necessary for the existence of other 
(grounded) objects but not vice versa. Without 
abstract objects (as we conceive them) no con-
crete objects exist. It may be said however that 
without concrete objects abstract ones don’t exist 
as well and so this is not the case of grounding. 
The answer is this. When it goes about particular 
objects a concrete object does not exist without 
abstract but any abstract object can exist without 
any of the concrete. Surely abstract objects need 
for its existence something concrete. But all con-
crete objects do not pre-exist before every one of 
them. And every one of them is not unique and 
therefore is grounded by abstract objects. 
It is commonly acknowledged that abstract ob-
jects are not located in space. Less common are 
statements about their timelessness. It is mostly 
this point which causes difficulties in defending 
the reality of abstract objects. Absolute spaceless 
and timeless existence is the mark of strictly Pla-
tonist type of metaphysical realism. Today the 
main line is represented by a more moderate 
kind of realism. Abstract objects are not abso-
lutely excluded from time and space. Not pos-
sessing “a determinate temporal and spatial 
properties of the same kind as concrete physical 
objects or events”, as S. Klausen points out, they 
“should not commit us to view them as trans-
temporal or trans-spatial” [10, p. 4]. Even if ab-
stract objects are not themselves spatiotemporal 
in physical sense they somehow are connected 
with spatiotemporal objects. They exist by means 
of spatiotemporal objects, so they are indirectly 
spatiotemporal themselves. But obviously this 
locality of abstract objects is indirect. They lack 
immediate physical locality. How it is possible 
looks somewhat like a mystery, if we are not in-
clined to use the supernatural world conception.  
It may be that this is the principal point in resolv-
ing the problem of abstract objects. We are in 
need to change our physical outlook according to 
claims of metaphysics and this is not encouraged 
in our today’s naturalistic discourse. One possible 
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way to go out of trouble is not to refuse from the 
space-time concept but to generalize it. We may 
present locality in physical sense as not the only 
or even the necessary characteristic of space and 
time taken in a universal perspective. Then we 
could speak about abstract space and time draw-
ing the line between the abstract and the con-
crete analogously to objects. For mathematically 
thinking minds at least it seems not unnatural.  
The problem of deterministic relation of physi-
cally non-spatial abstract and physical spatial ob-
jects looks even more complex. Any ties in physi-
cal world are seen by the modern theoretical 
mind as fundamentally spatial. Even admitting 
non-spatial objects and their physical effective-
ness we need to answer the question: what real-
ity connects both abstract and physical objects – 
spatial or non-spatial? One instance of such ques-
tionable relation is that of mind and body. Ab-
stract objects in general are no less problematic 
in this sense. And again we have to construct 
some sort of common environment for physically 
spatial and physically non-spatial objects if we 
intend to provide a place for abstract objects 
within the known to us Universe. 
For closer defining abstract objects in meta-
physical sense we have to make this notion 
purely ontological. It is the task to abstract from 
abstraction, concentrating exclusively on object. 
We should search for something within objects 
(taking the word “within” in metaphorical sense 
not having in mind spatial location). It should be 
a part of object in most general sense of the term 
“part” (not spatial) and something coinciding in 
the same time with an object. There is a well-
known term for such an item, namely “the form “.  
Taking general idea from Aristotle we should try 
to define it more precisely. The form as it seems 
at first sight can be identified as structural parts 
of an object connected in some way. For instance 
geometrical form is made of parts connected by 
some spatial relation. Let’s take more strict defi-
nition – a form is a complex of an object's con-
stituents being in one type relation. This relation 
makes the whole out of parts of an object and dif-
ferentiates one whole from other such wholes. 
The form apparently is not identical with its con-
stituents, it is something more complex. It is also 
not a mere sum of constituents, it embrace their 
relation in its peculiarity (not relation itself but 
specific relation). Neither it is a mere relation, it 
is something being in relation. An object obvi-
ously has not one form but many as there are 
many relations in which parts of an object may 
be connected. It is acceptable to say also about 
one general form of an object compiled of other 
forms.  
Naturally forms are not everything in physical 
object (although an abstract or – better to say – a 
formal object is identical with its forms). Talking 
about something non-formal in physical objects it 
would be pertinent to apply one more Aristote-
lian term – “matter”. Matter is, first of all, the 
uniqueness of an object, something which cannot 
be duplicated therefore not existing in different 
locations. Forms coincide in a way with objects 
and it may raise the question about their exis-
tence. If a form (say – a general form) is identical 
with an object we have no reason to admit it as 
something specially existing. Metaphysical un-
derstanding of existence however makes this 
situation unproblematic. “Existence of some-
thing” in the most general and abstract sense 
means just “differing of something from every-
thing other than this”. To exist is to be different 
from all other entities. Forms differ from every-
thing which is not a form particularly from for-
malized objects. Therefore forms do exist. 
Locality and non-locality (in physical sense) is 
based on different types of relations. There are 
spatial relations which are created by spatial 
parts of objects and tie objects to special (unique) 
localities. There are, conversely, non-spatial rela-
tions – structural, functional, typological, which 
in themselves are realized without localization in 
space. Relations, as it was stated before, define 
the character of forms. Hence forms may be local 
and non-local. One can assume as well that every 
physical object has both spatial and non-spatial 
forms. Spatial forms define localization of objects. 
It may be called “the local forms” of an object. A 
local form is made of material parts of an object 
and in this sense may be termed also “the mate-
rial form”. There are, besides, non-local forms of 
an object. They are made of parts which relate 
independently of locality of a physical object. 
Components of such forms may have locality but 
their locality don’t influence the form, locality is 
left behind non-local forms. Their peculiarities 
are not defined by locality, so they exist out of 
physical space in some sense. Non-local forms 
lacking spatial features have another type of 
identification. They are not identical by identical 
placement. Their identity therefore is qualitative 
(not numerical). Nothing differentiates one form 
from another if they are partially or completely 
identical in qualities. So one form (or its part) 
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may be represented in locally different physical 
objects.  
Still it is the question how non-local forms are 
represented (or “instantiated”) in local objects. It 
seems that we may use material forms as an in-
termediary between non-local forms and local 
(physical) objects. Another problem is with a 
type and direction of dependence between forms 
and material objects. The consideration concern-
ing necessary presence of forms in formalized 
material (particularly physical) objects should be 
answered. Forms at least of physical objects do 
not exist apart from these objects. But the con-
trary is also true. Physical objects do not exist 
without any forms. There is no use to discuss 
what is the primary reality in causal or temporal 
sense. It is obvious that there is some depend-
ence from both sides. It is also discernible that in 
the opposite directions dependence is different. 
Forms are dependent on material objects as 
structurally incomplete reality on structurally 
complete reality. Material objects are dependent 
on forms as something grounded on its grounds.  
There are various types of abstract objects: 
among them properties, natural kinds, mathe-
matical objects. Are those entities forms accord-
ing to how the forms were defined in this paper? 
Properties, according to P. van Inwagen, are 
’’ways in which a thing can be like a thing’’ [15, 
p. 121]. It looks plausible but may be rewritten in 
the terms of this paper like “relations in which 
parts of a thing are connected”. Properties from 
this point of view are forms taken in their aspect 
of relations connecting their components. Strictly 
speaking properties are not forms but are formal 
entities, they belong to forms.  
Natural kinds look like much closer entities to 
our definition of forms. Kinds’ characteristics in-
clude both relations and components of the ob-
jects of one kind. Every such unity forms a part of 
an individual entity common with other indi-
viduals. As this common part lacks spatial char-
acteristics it appears to be one and the same in 
different objects. So it may be said that individual 
objects carry in themselves the form of their 
kind.  
Mathematical objects are often discussed as the 
most representative abstract objects. The major 
interest is shown for numbers. Do the numbers 
fit our definition of forms? As numbers are coun-
terparts of properties in some sense it seems cor-
rect to provide them with similar formal role. 
Numbers represent that aspect of forms which 
consists in quantitative relations of components 
of a (complex) object (a set for instance). The be-
longing of geometrical forms to the domain of 
forms is intuitively evident. So, mathematical ob-
jects are a type of forms together with properties 
and kinds.  
One more type of entities formal in their essence 
worth noting. These are mental representations: 
thoughts, images, perceptions, memory, con-
sciousness etc. The may be more or less abstract 
but they are apparently formal. Mental represen-
tations fall within the definition of forms because 
they connect in non-local (physically) and non-
material way components of outer objects. Non-
material and non-local components of outer ob-
jects and their relations become immaterial rep-
resentations but fully preserve their formal as-
pect. Mental phenomena may be described as 
non-local forms differentiated in some mysteri-
ous way from local ones and from material ob-
jects. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of abstract objects existence, char-
acteristics, and functions is the main problem of 
metaphysics. Metaphysical view presupposes the 
reduction of the discussion solely to the ontologi-
cal aspect of the problem. Taken in purely onto-
logical sense abstract objects are the forms of ob-
jects. The forms exist, being the necessary com-
ponent of every real entity and at the same time 
not merging into form-bound entities, existing 
specifically. Differing from objects forms may be 
local and non-local, may exist in physical space or 
not in physical space. Non-local forms are repre-
sented in local forms which are in its turn repre-
sented in material objects. One non-local form 
may be represented in different material objects 
and in different locations. The forms are the 
ground of material objects but they depend on 
the latter as structurally incomplete reality. 
Commonly discussed abstract objects – proper-
ties, kinds, mathematical objects – are forms. The 
most interesting type of the forms is mental rep-
resentations as this is the only known to scien-
tific reason entities of purely formal character. 
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